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Preventing political violence in Britain: an evaluation of over forty years of 
undercover policing of political groups involved in protest 
 
Abstract 
This paper offers a first academic evaluation of the Special Demonstration Squad and the 
National Public Order Intelligence Unit, two British undercover police units working for the 
Metropolitan Police Service at different times between 1968 and 2011. It provides a 
historical overview of their infiltration of political groups involved in protest for the purpose 
of gathering criminal and political intelligence aimed at preventing violence, public disorder 
and subversion. It discusses the controversies surrounding these units, and the related 
institutional responses, and offers an attempt at understanding their operations within the 
remit of intelligence-led policing and against a political culture that prioritizes action over 
inaction in reducing risks and threats to the State and society. 
 
Keywords: undercover policing; intelligence; surveillance; political violence; protest.  
 
1. Introduction 
Much has been written in the media about the infiltration of political groups involved in 
protest by British police units since 1968. Since March 2010, when The Observer1 ran the 
first full story of a former undercover police officer (‘Officer A’, later identified as Peter 
Francis) working for the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) in March 2010, The Guardian2 
has led an exposé of both the SDS and the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) 
and has unveiled the extent to which these two undercover units 3  gathered pre-emptive 
intelligence ranging from the clear prevention of political violence to the collection of 
information on more peaceful and less disorderly political groups. 4  A series of official 
investigations on, and reviews about, these two units have been carried out and are discussed 
in this article. The main aim of this paper is to provide a first, exploratory academic study of 
the SDS and the NPOIU and to serve as a background study for future research on these two 
units and on the remits and limits of undercover policing within democratic societies. The 
first part will set the historical context and present an evaluation of the best currently 
available information on the activities of these two units. The second part will offer a more 
analytical understanding of the British undercover policing experience by exploring 
intelligence-led policing, both as a concept and as a practice, in relation to the SDS and the 
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NPOIU. Lastly, the paper will reflect on the political culture that may have informed many of 
the ideas behind the infiltration of violent and less or non-violent political groups. 
 
2. A brief history of the Special Demonstration Squad (1968-2008) and the 
National Public Order Intelligence Unit (1999-2011) 
The Special Operations Squad (SOS) was born in 1968 as an undercover unit within 
Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) with support and funding from the Home 
Office. A letter dated 16 December 1968 contains the original authorization for the 
deployment of SDS undercover officers by the Home Office.5 Up until 1989, the Home 
Office maintained authority over, provided direct annual funding6 and authorization for, and 
received an annual summary7 of the unit’s operations, while Special Branch Commander 
Operations was authorizing individual deployments and receiving an annual report. In 1989 
the Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) was transferred the responsibility 
of the annual authorization of the unit’s operations while Special Branch Commander 
Operations maintained its role to sign and authorize individual deployments.8 After the direct 
annual funding9 and authorization stopped in 1989, investigations found no evidence that the 
Home Office had knowledge of, or influence on, the SDS operational activities. However, a 
file for which there exists a consistent file reference (Queens Peace Series, that is a series of 
files on public order maintenance) but went missing due to either human error or purposeful 
concealment10 might have revealed more about the Home Office’s knowledge of, and links 
with, the SDS beyond 1989. 
The unit was formed in the delicate sociopolitical context of the late 1960s, when the 
State was facing an increasing threat of public disorder and political violence,11 a threat 
grown in a decade of ‘anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, anti-sexism, anti-capitalism and 
anti-“oldism”’12 among hardline radicals embracing a counterculture of ‘a new and more 
aggressive “hippiedom” born of disillusion and marginality’13 and characterized by anarchist 
tendencies. Notably, it was a threat that would escalate in the 1970s when Great Britain and, 
especially, London would be 
Plagued by what appeared to be a breakdown in law and order, especially in 
immigrant areas and during strikes, a direct assault on the government and its 
agencies by groups such as the Angry Brigade and Tartan Army and the 
sustained mainland bombing by the IRA. Equally concerning was the growing 
interconnection between terrorist groups and foreign “rogue” nations who 
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seemed to sponsor and direct terrorist cells within London, in undeclared war 
against foreign diplomats and embassies. Inter-racial strife seemed 
symptomatic of a growing helplessness in the face of organized anarchy.14 
Notably, the SDS emerged out of Special Branch Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon’s plan, 
possibly as part of a broader MPSB’s enlarged ‘C’ Squad and informant coverage and 
certainly supported by then Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson,15 to respond to the violent 
protests of anti-Vietnam War demonstrators who targeted the United States Embassy in 
Grosvenor Square in London on 18 March 1968. Within this context, the unit ‘was to be 
maintained with the strictest secrecy, so as not to compromise the Government or its sensitive 
operations.’16 A London-based unit, albeit with a national MPSB remit too, it soon aimed at 
gathering intelligence beyond the anti-Vietnam war demonstrators and infiltrated a range of 
political, activist and protest groups across the ideological spectrum (from the far-right to the 
far-left) which were deemed to pose a security threat. Towards the end of 1972, the unit was 
renamed Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) and, later in 1997, Special Duties Section when 
the unit’s targets widened and the geographical remit extended. The SDS continued gathering 
intelligence and infiltrating groups until 2008, when it was officially disbanded. In its forty 
years of operations, it is estimated that a total of about 150 undercover police officers served 
in this undercover unit,17 which was known by officers within MPSB but worked in partial 
isolation from Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).18 
The unit was placed within Special Branch (SO12) due to historical and procedural 
reasons. Special Irish Branch had been gathering intelligence since as far back as 1883, when 
it was set up to tackle bomb attacks by Irish republicans in London.19 In 1888 it was renamed 
Special Branch and expanded its mandate to include other threats to the State,20 especially 
anarchists within foreign immigrant groups, with a particular interest in the surveillance and 
infiltration of those on the left side of the political spectrum21 and ‘no comparable interest in 
the activities of British fascists until the [Second World] War.’22 For more than one hundred 
years Special Branch, ‘a separate, specifically political, unit within the police in Britain,’23 
collected intelligence on terrorists and subversives in the United Kingdom who were posing a 
threat to the wellbeing of the State and were attempting to overthrow parliamentary 
democracy through political, industrial and/or violent means. 24  Special Branch was 
terminated and subsumed, along with the Anti-Terrorist Branch (SO13), into Counter 
Terrorism Command (CTC / SO15) in 2006,25 although already in the 1990s some of its 
responsibilities (notably, intelligence gathering on Irish republicans) had been taken over by 
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the Security Service which, after 9/11 and 7/7, expanded ‘its national intelligence 
management role, and policing, Special Branch included, became more focused on 
investigation and operational support activity.’26 As required by Home Office guidelines, 
core Special Branch’s functions included the acquisition, assessment and interpretation of 
intelligence, also with a focus on maintaining the ‘Queen’s Peace’, that is public order,27 and 
with an increasing interest in animal rights extremists between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s, 
and a key duty to support the Security Service in its work on espionage, subversion and 
sabotage aimed at protecting national security.28 The SDS worked within MPSB’s remit29 
and carried out a prime function of both collecting pre-emptive intelligence on political 
violence, public disorder and the threat of subversion predominantly, albeit not only, at 
demonstrations and supporting the work of the Security Service. Intelligence was sanitized, 
by removing reference to the SDS and/or the operative, and sent as ‘Secret and Reliable 
Source’ to the relevant Special Branch desks30 within the ‘C’ Squad (Desk for Animal Rights 
and Environmental Extremism and Desk for Extreme Left Wing and Extreme Right Wing)31 
on a weekly basis.32 SDS officers also held regular meetings with the Security Service to pass 
on intelligence on groups of interest33 at least from 1974.34 A small number of Home Office 
officials were also made aware of some specific groups that were targeted and the type of 
intelligence that was gathered through infiltration at least between 1968 and 1989 35 and 
possibly also afterwards, given that the SDS could have reasonably remained part of the 
Home Office’s interest in all aspects of MPSB’s work. 
A similar unit, the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU), was set up 
within MPS in 1999 and funded by the Home Office. The NPOIU absorbed the Northern 
Intelligence Unit (NIU)36 and the Southern Intelligence Unit (SIU)37 and replaced the Animal 
Rights National Index (ARNI), 38  which had all been set up in 1986. 39  Through its 
Confidential Intelligence Unit (CIU) the NPOIU gathered and co-ordinated intelligence as 
part of police’s ‘response to campaigns and public protest which generate[d] violence and 
disruption (particularly those focused on animal rights, some environmental issues and 
extreme political activism).’40 The NPOIU operated nationally, whereas the SDS was mostly 
London based, despite still maintaining a national MPSB’s remit. There is evidence of a 
small number of staff and managers working for both the SDS and the NPOIU for the 
purposes of ‘training, providing guidance, recruiting staff and authorising undercover 
operations.’41 In 2006, the NPOIU was placed within, and was overseen by, the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)42 although it was still run by MPS. In 2011 it moved back 
to MPS (within CTC) when, together with the National Extremism Tactical Co-ordination 
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Unit (NETCU)43 and the National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET),44 it was incorporated 
into the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU).45 
The groups46 that were infiltrated by the SDS and the NPOIU vary in political and 
ideological connotations, ranging from the far-right to the far-left. Some groups were 
involved in politically motivated violent actions towards persons and properties and/or 
engaged in serious public and social disorder with a capacity to lead to subversion. These are 
groups47 that could have been considered, in more orthodox terms, to have posed a threat to 
national security48 and include, for example: Animal Liberation Front,49 Angry Brigade, Free 
Wales Army,50 Combat 18, Red Action, Troops Out Movement, Socialist Workers Party, 
Revolutionary Communist Party, Class War, National Front and British National Party. Other 
groups did not necessarily engage in serious violence and/or plan to subvert the existing 
order; its activists51 took the streets to protest and demonstrate posing a threat of less serious 
and/or less sustained public disorder.52 These ranged from hard-left Marxist and anarchist 
groups to soft-left socialist groups expounding a series of intertwined sociopolitical causes 
such as environmentalism (for example: London Greenpeace, 53 Rising Tide, Earth First, 
Climate Camp and Common Place), animal rights (for example: South London Animal 
Movement), anti-racism (for example: Youth Against Racism in Europe 54 and Anti-Nazi 
League55), anti-war (for example: Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army and Stop the 
War Coalition), anti-globalization (for example: Globalise Resistance and Reclaim the 
Streets) and anti-capitalism/anarchism (for example: Cardiff Anarchist Network, Militant 
Tendency, Direct Action Movement, International Marxist Group and White Overalls 
Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles). According to some former undercover 
officers, the police’s rationale for infiltrating some of these groups was that they could act as 
fronts for, or offer tacit support to, violent and subversive groups and/or were useful as 
platforms to establish credibility and gain access to clandestine violent and/or subversive 
groups.56 The overarching feature defining several of these more peaceful and less disorderly 
groups appears to be a tendency to share anti-capitalist ideologies, which is not surprising 
given that much infiltration happened during the Cold War57 and that anti-capitalism has also 
characterized modern protest groups, which are sustained by ‘a whole package of values, 
some anarchist, some libertarian, but just as often a rather old fashioned Trotskyist socialism’ 
and which expound a plurality of causes including ‘anti-Americanism, […] anti-airport 
expansionism and anti-fat-cat-ism.’58 The targeting of anti-capitalist groups also links to the 
findings of a study conducted by Eveline Lubbers showing the existence of collaborations 
between corporations and police in monitoring groups and people considered to pose a threat 
 6 
to business profit and capitalist ideology.59 The risk that peaceful and legitimate protest and 
dissent remain trapped within Special Branch’s potentially political characterizations of 
subversive activities and governments’ vague goals of protecting the security of the State was 
already noted by scholars in the late 1970s and early 1980s.60 But to counterbalance this 
view, it is true that not all groups that claim to be peaceful are necessarily law abiding. This 
is the case of ‘peace activists’ who would routinely commit criminal damage and seek to 
defend it on the basis that it was symbolic61 and/or morally justified. 
To impersonate political activists, undercover police officers developed personal 
stories (‘legends’) that helped to bolster their credibility. They adopted new identities taken 
from the birth certificates of deceased children of a suitable age had they lived, they changed 
their appearance62 to resemble that of their targets, they became well versed in politics, they 
lived with the infiltrated groups for five or six days a week for several years (often to the 
detriment of their psychological wellbeing)63 and they committed minor crimes.64 The fact 
that undercover police officers were tasked with ‘deep cover’ assignments for such protracted 
periods of time (several years) was a departure from standard MPS’s practice of setting a 
specific, time-limited (several months) infiltration of a criminal group, gather evidence and 
pass such evidence on to investigators.65 From a tactical point of view, the deployment of 
undercover police officers infiltrating organized crime groups is naturally shorter due to its 
narrow aim to get in, get the result, facilitate an arrest and get out. The cardinal reasons for 
extending infiltration to a much longer period of time rest on the structured nature of activist 
groups (or, in unstructured groups, the need to embrace a lifestyle, for example squatting), 
the closed environments within which criminality associated to protest is planned and the 
related necessity to build trust over time, and a longer timespan required to prove one’s 
commitment to a political cause.66 
The series of revelations concerning these secret police units67 and made public by 
The Observer68 in March 2010 and, subsequently, by The Guardian69 have offered a good 
amount of information (some of which still needs to be properly assessed) on over forty years 
of police infiltration of political groups involved in protest. At the same time, they have 
spurred much public debate,70 eventually leading to a number of investigations over several 
unethical and possibly illegal practices carried out by police officers in the course of their 
duties. The next Section will explore such investigations. 
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3. Institutional investigations into the SDS and the NPOIU 
The outing of a number of SDS and NPOIU undercover police officers and the ongoing 
allegations that they had engaged in misconduct and possibly illegal activities has led to a 
number of reviews and investigations into the practices of the two units. After revelations 
made in 2010 about the activities of former NPOIU officer Mark Kennedy, who would later 
prompt the collapse of a trial against six environmental activists who had planned to shut 
down a power station in Ratcliffe-on-Soar (Nottinghamshire) in 2009, 71  Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate for Constabulary launched a review72 of the NPOIU, and to a much lesser extent 
of the SDS, with particular reference to the authorization and the control of undercover police 
officers tasked with preventing crime associated to domestic extremism and public disorder. 
In October 2011, a review of the SDS called ‘Operation Soisson’ was also launched and 
placed under the direction of Deputy Assistant Commissioner Mark Simmons. Following 
new allegations, ‘Operation Soisson’ was renamed ‘Operation Herne’ in August 2012, when 
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Patricia Gallan from the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) took the lead. After new media allegations over the use of dead children’s 
identities by SDS officers sparked new public outrage, Chief Constable Mick Creedon QPM 
from Derbyshire Constabulary was handed responsibility and oversight of ‘Operation Herne’, 
for it to be an independent review, by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir 
Bernard Hogan-Howe. 73 At the same time, the Home Secretary Theresa May commissioned 
Mark Ellison QC to conduct a review on corruption associated with the initial investigation 
on the murder of Stephen Lawrence and on any corruption that the Metropolitan Police 
Service (not the SDS) had had evidence of and had failed to disclose to the Macpherson 
Inquiry. With specific reference to undercover policing, Ellison was also tasked to investigate 
Peter Francis’ allegations that he had been deployed as an SDS undercover police officer to 
find evidence that could be used to smear the family of Stephen Lawrence.74 Following the 
Ellison Review, the Home Secretary Theresa May commissioned Stephen Taylor, a former 
Director at the Audit Commission,75 to conduct an investigation into the links between the 
Home Office and the SDS and announced a statutory inquiry to be led by Lord Justice 
Pitchford.76 Further investigations are still being conducted by the ‘Operation Herne’ team 
and by the Independent Police Complains Commission (IPCC). 
Published findings from the various investigations and reviews have so far confirmed 
that undercover officers used deceased children’s identities, fostered sexual relationships with 
unsuspecting female activists (also fathering a child in at least one occasion), were involved 
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in minor criminal activities, appeared in court under false names and recorded information on 
at least eighteen justice campaigns. While the investigation conducted by Stephen Taylor 
could not find evidence, through documentary sources and interviews with senior civil 
servants77 (but no former MPSB officer) working between 1975 and 1989, that the Home 
Office was ever aware or authorized such practices, due to a lack of documents and lapse of 
time it cannot be ruled out that the Home Office had such knowledge.78 Allegations79 made 
by jailed Animal Liberation Front activist Geoff Sheppard and brought forward by Caroline 
Lucas MP that an SDS police officer planted a firebomb causing £340,000 worth of damage 
to a Debenhams factory in Harrow (London) in 1987 was denied by the accused Bob Lambert 
and are still being investigated. The Ellison Review found no evidence on the smearing of 
Stephen Lawrence’s family but could not entirely reject Peter Francis’ claims due to a lack of 
written records from the era and the fact that ‘if there had been such tasking, it would most 
likely have been oral.’80 ‘Operation Herne’ also found no evidence that the SDS was tasked 
against and to smear the Stephen Lawrence family.81 Such lack of evidence led the IPCC to 
feel unable to conduct an investigation into this matter.82 Yet, the Ellison Review noted that 
SDS police officers had been deployed within groups that were attempting to influence the 
Lawrence family and that one such officer gathered personal information on the family and 
obtained tactical intelligence on the Macpherson Inquiry 83 (further investigations on this 
matter are being conducted by the IPCC).84 But ‘Operation Herne’ argued that a high-profile 
incident might be reported on if there is a violent protest group attached to it and that such a 
group, rather than the incident or the family, would be targeted and infiltrated. In this sense, 
‘Operation Herne’ maintains that ‘the fact that an undercover deployment made a reference to 
the Stephen Lawrence family does not [necessarily] mean there was undercover deployment 
against the Stephen Lawrence family.’85  
 Following a High Court ruling in mid-2014, for the first time MPS was forced 
to reveal the names of two undercover police officers (Jim Boyling and Bob Lambert)86 who 
had had sexual relationships with female activists under assumed identities.87 At the same 
time, a woman who had a child with one such police officer won a £425,000 out-of-court 
settlement from MPS.88 In what are very contested and unclear procedures, it is believed that 
the police never enforced any rule over sexual relationships and that agents were free to 
choose how to conduct themselves.89 Ongoing investigations have so far found no evidence 
that the practice was ever authorized or explicitly used as a tactic to aid infiltration. 90 
Nevertheless, it may not be unreasonable to expect that developing an intimate relationship 
with a member of an infiltrated political group91 (out of passion, genuine love or operational 
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necessity) positively helped to strengthen the officer’s credibility and, as Gordon Turnbull 
argues, reduced the risk of being detected, harmed and possibly killed, 92 especially in a 
climate of opposition to, and violence against, the police at demonstrations (for example the 
Poll Tax Riots in 1990)93 and during far-right / far-left clashes (for example, the Welling riot 
in 1993). 94  Fostering intimate relations with members of target groups has not just 
characterized British undercover police units but finds evidence in the American experience 
too, when it either was used as a tactic or naturally resulted from protracted involvement in 
tight-knit, ideologically committed and socially progressive groups often encouraging 
promiscuous tendencies among its members. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents 
infiltrating the radical left-wing organization Weather Underground95 and Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) agents infiltrating Maoist political groups 96  developed intimate 
relationships with female members who helped to collect information on, and garner 
credibility within, the groups. Notably, the late Daryl Gates, former Chief of Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD), is attributed to have enthusiastically endorsed sexual 
relationships with targets 97 and to have mentored undercover police officers tasked with 
sleeping with women in order to gather political information.98 While many American federal 
agencies in the 1980s could dismiss agents who had become sexually involved with targets to 
avoid compromising the agent himself/herself and/or tainting the evidence, different police 
units had different rules and guidelines,99 demonstrating the morass of moral and institutional 
ambiguities100 surrounding undercover policing across different jurisdictions. More broadly, 
intimate relationships are indicative of the changing loyalties and altered attitudes and beliefs 
that might affect undercover officers who ‘can feel torn between actual camaraderie that 
develops between them and their targets, and the larger purpose for which they have been 
assigned.’101  
Many of the controversial activities carried out by the SDS fell within what had 
always been low levels of regulation of police surveillance throughout British history.102 The 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) took a step towards regulating 
undercover policing and mandated that undercover police officers be dealt with by laws for 
Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS). Nowadays, authorizations to deploy officers 
under RIPA need to consider the risks involved against the CHIS, with responsibilities for the 
authorizing officer to protect the CHIS extending beyond the end of his/her duties.103 They 
also need to set clear goals for the deployments and specify the appropriate intelligence to be 
collected. In this sense, specific objectives and ‘use and conduct’ guidelines set out in RIPA 
would have ensured that, in the case of the recording of information on justice campaigns, 
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undercover officers ‘would not themselves filter the information that they had become aware 
of. […Instead, they] would gather and report all of the detail relevant to the groups that they 
infiltrated.’104 On this same issue, police managers failed to properly apply the Management 
of Police Information (MOPI), ‘which would have [otherwise] led to a proper assessment of 
relevance and the weeding of unnecessarily retained irrelevant personal information.’105 The 
fact that SDS officers did not undergo the national undercover training, the absence of RIPA 
throughout much of the SDS history and, when RIPA was introduced, the apparent failure of 
management and authorizing officers to comply with the law created a fertile ground for 
collateral intrusion and for the gathering of sensitive information. 106  However, the 
introduction of RIPA alone has not acted as a panacea. It is true that it provides a legal 
framework compliant with the European Convention of Human Rights (although some 
experts disagree) 107  for special investigation techniques, such as interception of 
communications, covert surveillance, use of informants 108  and undercover officers, and 
bugging.109 However, it is debatable whether its principle of using human intelligence in 
proportion to what it aims to achieve and to minimize any loss in public confidence was 
upheld at all times in the later years of the SDS and throughout the NPOIU existence. In this 
sense, it did not prevent NPOIU officers from engaging in contested activities, such as sexual 
relationships with targets, which prompted the House of Commons 110  to call for a 
fundamental review of the existing legislative and regulatory framework. 
Today there are numbers of further safeguards in place and there are several protocols 
requiring to produce identities and documentation which vastly differ from the times when 
the SDS operated and from the initial years of the NPOIU. These safeguards and protocols 
include: 
[1] The College of Policing (COP) “Authorised Professional Practice” (APP) 
Oversight. 
[2] A national training course for UCOs [Undercover Officers]. 
[3] Authority levels of UCO deployments being at the Assistant Chief 
Constable level – although the RIPA legislation places this at superintendent 
level. 
[4] The need for detailed reviews and renewal of any such authorised 
deployments, always considering necessity and proportionality. 
[5] Clear “use and conduct” being stipulated in any such deployment which 
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definitively articulate in any activity that a UCO may engage.111 
Despite these efforts, there remains evidence that these safeguards and protocols are yet to be 
fully and effectively implemented. Following recommendations set out in its 2012 review of 
the NPOIU and SDS and a request that further inspection be conducted to examine all 
undercover policing in England and Wales,112 in June 2013 the Home Secretary Theresa May 
commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate for Constabulary to carry out such work. The 
findings are set out in a review of the broader practice of undercover policing across 43 
police forces and law enforcement agencies (for example: the National Crime Agency) 
deploying undercover officers in England and Wales. 113  The report found ongoing 
deficiencies in undercover policing procedures. Such deficiencies include lack of expertise 
among senior leaders and procedural inconsistencies across police forces (for example: 
selection, training and day-to-day work) also attributable to little coordinated direction by the 
National Undercover Working Group. 114  The report further highlighted a great level of 
variation in the quality of written authorizations for deployment by assistant chief 
constables.115 It blamed the Authorized Professional Practice Covert Undercover Operations 
document for providing inadequate guidance to undercover police officers. Notably, the 
report blamed the ‘culture of secrecy amongst the undercover community’116 for acting as a 
barrier to scrutiny, in particular failing to share such document to lawyers of the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) and to psychologists responsible for the welfare of undercover 
police officers. In October 2014, the National Policing Lead for Undercover Policing, Deputy 
Chief Constable Jon Boutcher, released a statement arguing that changes had been made and 
that undercover operations are currently rigorously overseen and subject to scrupulous 
authorizations.117 Overall, that undercover policing ‘be necessary and proportionate to the 
intelligence dividend that it seeks to achieve and […] be fully compliant with the European 
Convention on Human Rights’118 is a goal that institutional reviews seem to suggest will be 
achieved only through strong oversight over, and clear procedures regulating, undercover 
policing activities. In this sense, the National Undercover Scrutiny Panel set up by the 
College of Policing in March 2015 could be a further step to both improve best policing 
practices and standards and provide additional scrutiny on undercover policing 
arrangements.119 But beyond oversight and regulation, there remains to understand how the 
SDS and the NPOIU fit within the wider remits and limits of intelligence gathering. The next 
Section will attempt to give an answer to it. 
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4. SDS, NPOIU and the remits and limits of intelligence gathering 
Enshrined in the rationale driving the establishment of the SDS and the NPOIU resided the 
principle of gathering pre-emptive intelligence to intercept criminal plans (political violence 
and public disorder) and to stop them before they are executed. In many ways the collection 
of this type of information would later be conceptualized as an intelligence-led model of 
policing. Originally articulated by the Audit Commission in 1993 and by the Home Office in 
1997, first operationalized by the Chief Constable of Kent Police David Phillips120 and more 
recently encapsulated in the National Intelligence Model,121 the concept of intelligence-led 
policing remains elusive.122 Tentative definitions have proliferated. On the one hand, there is 
convergence in recognizing that collecting and analyzing information plays a pivotal role in 
producing ‘an intelligence end product designed to inform law enforcement decision making 
at both the tactical and strategic levels.’123 According to this way of thinking, intelligence-led 
policing ‘manage[s] information about threats and risks to strategically manage the policing 
mission.’124 In this approach, which is becoming more and more centered on the tools offered 
by new technologies, ‘information work’ represents the most important aspect of policing.125 
Information inflow originates from either visible or invisible methods of policing. The latter 
is central to traditional intelligence and rests on a modus operandi that removes the 
information gathering process from the eyes of the public 126  by utilizing surveillance, 
informants, and internal and external databases.127 A form of social control strategy founded 
on the operational and symbolic power of information, intelligence can therefore be 
considered ‘a mode of information […] that has been interpreted and analysed in order to 
inform future actions of social control against an identified target.’128 On the other hand, 
there remain large areas of uncertainty as to the real, rather than ideal, remits of intelligence-
led policing activities. It is true that there exists a clear focus on crime reduction and 
prevention, 129 particularly through ‘both strategic management and effective enforcement 
strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.’ 130 It is within the context of targeting 
prolific offenders and their loose networks that the Audit Commission originally suggested 
the police use more proactive policing tactics centered around intelligence gathering.131 In 
other words, it is believed that greater use of surveillance and human intelligence sources 
underlines a model of policing which places intelligence at the center of the decision making 
process132 to specifically target prolific and serious criminals and triage out most crimes from 
further investigation (also reducing duplication).133 Procedural inconsistencies in some of the 
operations of the SDS and the NPOIU, and in particular the targeting of some groups which 
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did not pose an obvious criminal threat, make it problematic to justify their full mandate 
under an intelligence-led policing approach. 
 In part this situation can be explained by the fact that the conceptual and practical 
articulations of intelligence-led policing were made only towards the later stages of the SDS, 
and that the NPOIU may have followed on from its ‘tried and tested’ methods. Importantly, it 
also springs from the peculiar approach that the two units took in collecting a blend of 
criminal intelligence and political intelligence (the latter potentially informing the former). 
The collection of intelligence springing from politically active groups involved in protest, 
unlike the gathering of evidence typical of undercover police units infiltrating criminal gangs, 
is focused on future-oriented risk reduction. In other words, while undercover units 
infiltrating criminal gangs collect evidence to bring about immediate prosecutions, 
undercover units infiltrating political groups collect information that assist in the prevention 
of violence and public disorder potentially happening at various times in the future. Cardinal 
to such preventative work are the uncertainties as to whether some groups will or will not 
resort to political violence, public disorder and/or other crimes in pursuance of their 
objectives. There is no doubt that the SDS and the NPOIU gathered criminal intelligence on 
groups posing a threat to national security (see Section 3), if such intelligence is to be 
understood as ‘information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, 
prevent, or monitor criminal activity.’ 134  However, the two units also gathered political 
intelligence on less or non-violent groups (see Section 3) which might or might not have 
subsequently informed criminal intelligence. While it cannot so obviously be ruled out that 
the State, working through the Metropolitan Police Service, sought to neutralize political 
opposition, a more cautious explanation for the collection of political intelligence is 
underpinned by an understanding of how politically active groups work: even when 
remaining within the boundaries of legally protected activity, they work through the 
intangibles of politics (alliances, plans, discussions, speeches, et cetera). It is often hard to 
implement a binary system of assessment (‘risk of serious crime’/‘no risk of serious crime’) 
of such intangibles, and the actual (rather than perceived) risk of violence, public disorder 
and subversion cannot always be gauged with infallible accuracy. Further confusion and 
complexity emerge when peaceful and well-meaning activists consciously or unconsciously 
mingle with violent and dangerous ones. This is particularly problematic when groups that 
claim to be peaceful provide safe havens for activists prepared to carry out more serious acts 
of criminal damage. 
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There also exists an element of competition across and within police forces in a battle 
for financial resources and operational priorities. While at the moment there is no sufficient 
information to state whether the SDS and the NPOIU operated within such a framework, it is 
nevertheless worth mentioning the ongoing trend in ‘specialist units focusing on individual 
crime phenomena […which continue] to advertise (often limited) success in a continued 
battle for scarce resources.’ 135  Besides exploring the legitimacy of preventing strictly 
political (rather than strictly criminal) threats to society and the established order, future 
research should also consider whether some of the more peaceful and less disorderly groups 
were deemed to merit deep and sustained infiltration within the confines of ‘strategic 
intelligence analysis’ in order to identify ‘new types of criminality’ so as to prioritize ‘the 
allocation of scarce resources.’136 This issue will be particularly important for scholars of 
policing and organizational studies. Proactive methods of policing, such as intelligence 
gathering and the disruption of criminal syndicates, have historically been the domain of 
specialist teams and squads within the police, for example Criminal Investigation 
Departments (CIDs) and Regional Crime Squads (RCSs).137 There is a crucial question as to 
whether plainclothes officers of CIDs, RCSs and Special Branch, responsible for crime 
investigation and prevention, could develop distinct occupational cultures to uniformed 
policemen and could also compete for scarce resources and funding, being in a constant 
search for targets to gather intelligence on in order to justify their existence. 
Beyond these more speculative suggestions, there exist the realities of the impact that 
undercover policing work has on broader society, notably unintended and dire consequences 
and ‘damage [spreading] like a virus – contaminating all it touches [and] lead[ing] to a deep 
pile of hurt.’138 Moreover, gathering intelligence for the prevention of serious crime and 
disorder, as opposed to gathering evidence to be used in court, tends to disincentivize police 
officers from following correct procedures and from ensuring that undercover activities are 
necessary and proportionate to the threat posed by the targeted groups.139 When coupled with 
the high level of intrusion in the lives of activists, particularly those of a more peaceful and 
less disorderly nature, and the potential disregard for civil liberties, the SDS and the NPOIU 
positioned themselves within a grey procedural area. Notably, the secrecy and deception that 
are axiomatic to undercover policing naturally threatened the Peelian philosophy of ‘policing 
by consent.’ Beyond raising questions about the criteria by which particular groups were to 
be targeted and infiltrated, especially with regard to the myriads of ways in which the threat 
of political violence and public disorder can manifest and be assessed, the operations of the 
two undercover police units speak to the heart of public expectations of what police are 
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mandated to do. Naturally, the removal of policing work from the scrutiny of the public can 
sustain perceptions that institutions operating in the name of the res publica are not fully 
accountable; it is well known that direct police communication can enhance trust and 
confidence in the police.140 The public outrage at some of the activities of the SDS and the 
NPOIU is all too problematic in a context in which the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry141 still 
hounds public confidence in the Metropolitan Police Service, even more so in recent times 
with the high profile deaths of Jean Charles de Menezes, 142 Ian Tomlinson 143 and Mark 
Duggan144 during or following police contact, and in which the British State has incurred 
severe criticism for deploying counter-terrorist legislation, policy and measures aimed at 
widespread intelligence gathering (rather than the surgical identification and apprehension of 
terrorists) with regard to both Northern Ireland-related terrorism since the mid-1970s145 and 
al-Qaeda-related terrorism since 2001.146  
Undercover policing naturally encounters further hostility and criticisms insofar as it 
is ‘inherently different from normal policing because the safeguards that usually accompany 
overt justice processes are entirely absent.’147 It cannot be stressed enough that the pursuance 
of intelligence (especially that of a political, and not always criminal, nature) rather than 
evidence casts undercover police units as quasi extra-legal organizations, abiding to rules of 
pragmatism and necessity rather than procedure and ethics. It follows that: 
Because such investigations may not be predicated on concrete suspicion of 
wrongdoing, they may cast a wider net, yielding information whose validity 
may never be tested in court […,] may burden the exercise of freedom of 
speech, assembly, and religion and may compromise the privacy of 
confidential communications between members of targeted organizations.148 
This description fits squarely with the experience of the SDS and the NPOIU. Especially with 
regard to the former, investigations have uncovered that a culture of absolute secrecy149 was 
so deeply entrenched within the organization, valued by the Home Office,150 and unregulated 
by MPS, that it ‘operated as if it was exempt from the developing duty of proper disclosure 
required of the MPS in legal proceedings, and particularly in criminal prosecutions,’ 151 
potentially leading to miscarriages of justice (these being currently investigated with regard 
to both the SDS and the NPOIU by Mark Ellison QC).152 But a cardinal issue that future 
studies on the British infiltration of political groups involved in protest will need to address is 
whether the failures emerging from the ongoing investigations and institutional reviews: (a) 
reflect a pathology of the SDS,153 the NPOIU, and/or MPS/ACPO more broadly: (b) are the 
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result of either rogue officers or institutional (ir)responsibility; (c) are a consequence of the 
very essence of undercover policing combined with a lack of proper legislative regulation, 
procedural clarity and supervisory effectiveness. 
Lastly, it is important to remember that historically police spies, stool pigeons, agent 
provocateurs and informers ‘have been generally regarded with aversion and nauseous 
disdain.’154 Fears and anxiety of police powers go far back in time, and the 1928’s newspaper 
story warning promenaders in Hyde Park of the dangers of plainclothes officers155 is a telling 
example. Unlike the deception naturally part of conventional policing, undercover policing 
presents unique peculiarities insofar as ‘suspects are unaware of both the purpose and the 
identity of the police.’156 It is true that deploying undercover operatives maintains a prime 
function and operational necessity of collecting information on, for example, (a) clandestine, 
political groups that pose a serious security threat and that cannot be reached through means 
other than infiltration and (b) potentially risky groups which might not co-operate to more 
transparent, empowering, participatory and inclusionary methods of ‘soft policing.’ 157 
However, it is equally true that some police tasks, notably the monitoring of subversives by 
Special Branch and order maintenance at demonstrations, ‘are avowedly concerned with the 
control of behavior which is explicitly political in motivation and intended impact.’158 Within 
this context, undercover policing, especially when dealing with both crimes and political 
dissent, becomes the hallmark of a State-centered ‘high-policing,’159 in which secrecy, deceit 
and extra-legality spring naturally from its ‘ideological underpinnings of preserving the 
dominant political regime rather than protecting individual citizens.’160 With expectations 
that the police, as opposed to the Security Services, are mandated to do visible work, it is not 
surprising that revelations on the SDS and the NPOIU have incurred public outrage. In the 
end, the two units have found themselves in a paradoxical situation: while winning over the 
confidence and the trust of the public is key to achieving legitimacy, the invisible work of 
undercover units, and especially the collection of political intelligence, has the potential for 
such serious threats to civil liberties to often meet a priori rejection from the same public 
which should give the democratic mandate to State and police action. The question of 
legitimacy therefore becomes a question of both the limits of State autonomy in fulfilling the 
social contract and the different interests that law enforcement agencies are expected to serve. 
Yet, it is within a political culture that rewards action over inaction and stability overt 
uncertainty that the next Section will argue that the experiences of SDS and the NPOIU 
should be contextualized. 
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5. The political climate surrounding undercover policing 
The experiences of the SDS and the NPOIU are not a British exception but represent a 
historical continuum in Western political responses to real and perceived threats to the 
sociopolitical order. Although providing a full comparative historical account of State 
infiltration of political groups involved in protest is well beyond the scope of this paper, 
FBI’s COunter INTELligence PROgram (COINTELPRO) deserves to be mentioned as the 
prime example of Anglo-Saxon State-orchestrated monitoring and disruption of political 
groups posing a threat to the State. Running between 1956 and 1971, COINTELPRO targeted 
five perceived domestic threats through as many programs: (1) the ‘Communist Party, USA’ 
program (1956-1971); (2) the ‘Socialist Workers Party’ program (1961-1969); (3) the ‘White 
Hate Group’ program (1964-1971); (4) the ‘Black Nationalist Hate Group’ program (1967-
1971); and (5) the ‘New Left’ program (1968-1971).161 With an expressed aim of using 
covert means to protect national security, prevent violence and maintain the existing social 
and political order,162 COINTELPRO went much farther than the SDS and the NPOIU. It did 
not refrain from engaging in snitch-jacketing,163 encouraging gang warfare, 164 fabricating 
evidence,165 stealing membership lists166 and, more broadly, employing improper and illegal 
means. 167  Staunch critics consider COINTELPRO to have been an utterly ineffective 
counterintelligence program. 168 Although investigations and reviews of the SDS and the 
NPOIU in the past few years have started to unveil their rationale and operations, there are 
still gaps that need to be filled before we reach a full appraisal. Existing institutional reviews 
have offered mixed judgments of the SDS and the NPOIU. Despite openly criticizing many 
of their activities (see Section 3), there has also been recognition that the two police units 
served an important role in preventing and contrasting serious political violence and public 
disorder, rather than merely collecting political intelligence on peaceful groups. Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate for Constabulary notes that: 
The NPOIU was involved in the successful collection of intelligence on 
violent individuals […who] were not individuals engaging in peaceful protest, 
or even people who were found to be guilty of lesser public order offences 
[…but] were individuals intent on perpetrating acts of a serious and violent 
nature against citizens going about their everyday lives’.169  
Similarly, Derbyshire Constabulary’s independent investigation on the SDS speaks of 
undercover officers who ‘undertook difficult and dangerous work in challenging 
circumstances which undoubtedly included saving lives, protecting properties, disrupting 
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extremist groups and preventing disorder.’170 Stephen Taylor also mentions ‘a valuable role 
played by the SDS and brave and committed officers who gathered intelligence which was 
used to the benefit of the Metropolitan Police and wider society for a long period.’171 While 
there can be all sorts of interests hiding behind these statements, such positive assessments 
are certainly helpful in contrasting powerful media narratives geared towards the rejection of 
any police and State action that touches on civil liberties. More importantly, they hint at the 
complexities of the work carried out by the SDS and the NPOIU. While it is well established 
that undercover policing, whether involving political violence or organized crime, can 
prevent serious harm172 and that police officers can maintain high ethical and legal standards 
without necessarily losing sight of pragmatic and operational necessities,173 it is important 
that controversial units, such as the SDS and the NPOIU, receive a full, evidence-based 
appraisal which does not shy away from criticisms but, equally, recognizes successes. 
There is no doubt that the SDS and the NPOIU are set to leave a mark in British 
policing history as an example of mass surveillance and State disruption of political dissent. 
Approached from a critical point of view, the SDS and the NPOIU will be remembered as the 
feared long hands of the political elite and the State to subvert and neutralize their opposition. 
The geographical mandate of these police units will also excite debates on the ‘creeping 
nationalisation’ of British policing, 174 a trend that has intensified since 1967 and which 
threatens the tradition and principle of decentralized policing in England and Wales.175 The 
simultaneous surveillance of the leadership of the miners striking in 1984–85 by Special 
Branch undercover officers and by MI5 officers,176 linking ‘the control of industrial action 
[…] to the new public order anti-terrorist roles that the police were increasingly required to 
fulfill,’177 serves as a prime example of the coordinated action of the law enforcement’s wing 
of the State in nation-wide repression of political dissent. 
But there exists a less conspiratorial and more politically aware side of the story. In an 
age characterized by growing concerns over the hollowing out of civil liberties,178 and their 
problematic relationship with certain forms surveillance,179 more recently the technological 
types as carried out by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the infiltration of political groups involved in 
protest by the British police fits squarely within a wider political climate that has historically 
turned to action and stability over inaction and uncertainty. In his analysis of Western, and 
particularly American, governmental response to the threat of terrorism, Michael Ignatieff 
alludes to a deeply entrenched ‘muscular’ political culture which tends to prioritize national 
security during those times in which assessing risks rests on fragile grounds. Although he 
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does not go as far as to justify historical overreactions to emergency threats, such as the Red 
Scare of 1919, Ignatieff recognizes that net-widening preventative approaches function as a 
political reassurance that suspects are apprehended and both real and perceived risks are 
minimized. Specifically, Ignatieff talks of: 
[…A] political system [which] rewards overreaction because any politicians 
wants to go to the country saying better safe than sorry. And so overreaction is 
rewarded rather than underreaction. No politician, regardless of party, would 
be able to survive a second attack and the charge that he hadn't done enough to 
protect the country. That's why everybody's bound to overreact.180 
This political thinking is all too prevalent with respect to terrorism and political violence, as 
they entail actions intent to destabilize the State and public perceptions of security. What 
distinguishes ordinary crime from terrorism and political violence is their social costs. With 
reference to undercover policing, such a difference is crucial to comprehend the different 
priorities of units which infiltrate criminal gangs as opposed to units which infiltrate political 
groups involved in protest. If the police fail to seize a drug shipment, the cost associated with 
media and public condemnation, and related growing social insecurities, will be minimal. 
However, if a single bomb goes off, not only will political violence and terrorism have scored 
a goal, but public confidence in the State and law enforcement agencies, and their capacity to 
protect the security of its citizens, will be undermined. This is otherwise known as the 
double-infinite risk of terrorism, insofar as it features both uncertainty and potential 
catastrophe; in turn, it promotes policies and measures that ‘seek to prevent situations from 
becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the future.’181 The political emergence of a 
penal State182 grounded on a pervasive culture of control183 elevating crime to everyday fear, 
promoting ontological insecurity 184  and eroding social trust 185  is a well-established fact, 
especially within Anglo-Saxon circles of criminologists. Especially after 9/11, this has led 
more radically critical Western voices to talk about the juridical void of a ‘“state of 
exception” […which] appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and 
absolutism’ and suspends legal determinations, for example by blurring the distinction 
between the public and the private spheres.186 Equally, even scholars with a much more 
optimistic attitudes towards the State, who believe the latter to be an actor able to ‘civilize’ 
security, have noticed ‘a certain clawing back by the state of pluralized security authority in 
favour of a reassertion of the importance of “old” state agencies (the police, intelligence 
services, military).’187  
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This paper contends that British experience of the SDS and the American experience 
of COINTELPRO are solid evidence that old State agencies have always held a strong 
‘rowing’ function of delivering security, 188  especially when confronting the real and 
perceived threat of violence, public disorder and subversion springing from political groups, 
and particularly in periods of geopolitical tension. While it is true that, as Eveline Lubbers’ 
study demonstrates, both the SDS and the NPOIU capitalized on increasing collaborations 
with corporations and extended their remit far and beyond obvious criminal threats, blaming 
capitalism or neo-liberalism for police shortcomings is rather hasty. In particular, it does not 
consider the historical continuum of State-driven ‘political policing’ and its legitimacy from 
the point of view of the State as a largely conservative entity and a realpolitik actor which 
‘pursues self-interest [often] in violation of laws and norms [which it itself establish through 
its political institutions].’189 Notably, it fails to understand the activities of the SDS and the 
NPOIU as emanating from a cultural and political tradition which, as explained above, 
rewards action over inaction and stability over uncertainty in both preventing threats to the 
State and society and preserving the sociopolitical order. Lastly, it unhelpfully approaches the 
undercover policing of political groups in a Manichean form in which national security, 
surveillance and the limitation of freedoms are invariably bad, while political dissent, anti-
authoritarianism and civil liberties are uniquely good. It is only through a more sophisticated 
approach, which this paper aims to have set out, that one can fully comprehend the historical 
and political forces operating behind the establishment and the activities of the SDS and the 
NPOIU and, by inference, any other similar undercover police unit. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Studying over forty years of British experience in policing political groups involved in 
protest presents several challenges. Firstly, the relatively recent exposè of the SDS and the 
NPOIU and the continuing investigations into their activities mean that much information is 
yet to become public. Given the sensitivity of the topic and the fact that the voices of former 
undercover police officers are constrained by the Official Secret Acts, it is likely that the full 
story will never be made public. While this should not refrain scholars from studying these 
two units, it certainly alerts them of the limitations of research into such a highly sensitive 
political topic. 
Secondly, the policing of political groups lends itself to different angles of analysis. 
Whether the intersections between national security and civil liberties, the legal limits to 
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State action in preserving the existing order, the often difficult coexistence of procedures and 
pragmatism in undercover operations, the blurred boundaries between criminal intelligence 
and political intelligence or ethics vis-à-vis operational necessity, it is impossible to study this 
topic without prioritizing some elements over others. This paper has chosen to present a 
value-free, evidence-based account of the available information on the SDS and the NPOIU 
and a tentative analysis of the most crucial factors driving the operations of these two units, 
notably the aim to gather criminal and political intelligence as part of both a goal to minimize 
security risks to society and the State (this at times going as far as stifling legitimate political 
protest) and a natural outcome of a political culture that rewards action over inaction in 
preventing real and perceived security threats.  
Thirdly and lastly, public discussions on these two police units have been 
monopolized by the media to the point that they own the social, political and moral market as 
the prime source on undercover policing in Britain. The lack of any dispassionate academic 
study on the SDS and the NPOIU190 creates obvious difficulties in approaching the topic in 
absence of scholarly literature. However, this void opens up possibilities for academics in 
terrorism studies, criminology and policing to conduct research on what is probably the most 
debated issue in recent British policing history. A primary aim of this paper is therefore to 
provide a first evaluation of the SDS and the NPOIU in the hope that it can spur healthy 
academic debate on the remits and limits of undercover policing within a democratic society 
and, importantly, offer some help to ensure that ‘an important tool in the fight against crime’ 
is utilized in a context in which  ‘there is not repeat of [past] failings in the future.’191 
 
Authors’ Note 
This article is limited to an evaluation of the evidence that was publicly disclosed up to 31 
May 2015. Readers should be aware that yet to be disclosed findings of ongoing 
investigations and future revelations might change the scenario and affect some aspects of 
this evaluation. 
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